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degree of interference with free exercise of religion. The baccalaureate
programs in Dade County generally consisted of invocations, Bible
readings, prayers, hymns, sermons, and benedictions.23 The programs
were conducted by a religious leader; however, rabbis and Catholic
priests have generally declined to appear at such services..24 These
facts seem to indicate that the Dade County programs might have a
sufficient affect on religion to constitute a violation of the establishment clause. The question remains unsettled; the ultimate decision
will depend upon the precise facts of each case as presented.
GORDON

H.

HARRIS

MENTAL DISTRESS: DAMAGES ALLOWED FOR MALICIOUS
KILLING OF PLAINTIFF'S DOG
La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964)
Plaintiff brought action against a garbage collecting corporation
for the malicious killing of her dog by its employee. Plaintiff had
tied her miniature dachshund in her yard out of reach of her garbage
can, and when the defendant's employee entered the yard to pick up
the garbage the dog began barking. Looking out the window, plaintiff saw the garbage collector hurl an empty garbage can toward her
pet. She heard the dog yelp and upon going outside to investigate
found her pet had been struck and killed by the can. The collector,
who did not know the plaintiff or of her presence at the time of his
act, laughed and departed. On the afternoon of the day in question
plaintiff, who had been under medical care for a nervous condition
for the preceeding two years, visited her doctor in a state of marked
hysteria.
23. Brief for the Appellant, p. 6 (citing the record), Chamberlin v. Dade
County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1964).
24. Ibid.
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Basing her suit on these facts plaintiff sought punitive damages
on the allegation that defendant's acts were malicious and intentional,
and compensatory damages for mental suffering caused by the loss
of her dog and for the dog's actual value. The trial court rendered
a verdict of $2,000 compensatory damages and 1,000 punitive damages. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed that judgment
and remanded the case on the issue of damages." The district court
found that the trial judge had incorrectly instructed the jury that it
could consider the plaintiff's mental suffering in assessing compensatory damages. This reversal was grounded on the rule that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the "sentimental value" of her
dog. On certiorari the Supreme Court of Florida reinstated the trial
court's judgment and HELD, plaintiff could properly recover damages
for mental suffering as an element of an award of compensatory damages for the killing of her dog.
Under Florida law, in cases involving no contemporaneous physical
impact to the plaintiff, damages for mental distress are recoverable
only when the acts of the defendant display a disregard for the rights
2
of others sufficient to justify the imposition of punitive damages.
Thus, although damages for mental distress are allowable only as an
element of compensatory damages s the test employed in their assessment is the same as the test for the assessment of punitive damages.
This test appears to be whether the acts of the defendant were intentional, wanton, or malicious. 4 In applying this test, however, it is not
necessary that punitive damages actually be awarded; it is sufficient if
they could be awarded.
The La Porte case has three important aspects. Initially, it is a
reaffirmation of the limitation placed on the Florida "impact rule"
by the case of Kirksey v. Jernigan.5 Prior to that case, Florida courts
adhered to the much criticized 6 "impact rule," which required an
actual physical impact to the plaintiff's person as a prerequisite to a
recovery of damages for mental distress.7 In Kirksey, the Florida
Supreme Court limited this impact rule to cases involving simple
negligence by upholding an award of damages for mental distress resulting from an undertaker's intentional withholding of the body of
1. Associated Independents, Inc. v. La Porte, 158 So. 2d 557 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1963).
2. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
3. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1959).
4. Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
5. 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
6. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961)
overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Bosley v.
Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); PRossER,
ToRTS §11 (3d ed. 1964).
7. Mees v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 F.2d 691 (S.D. Fla. 1932).
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the plaintiff's child. The court expressly eliminated the impact requirement if it could be shown that the acts of a defendant were of
a nature sufficient to sustain the assessment of punitive damages. As
the defendant in La Porte did not contest the imposition of punitive
damages, the case clearly presented a fact situation permitting the
application of the Kirksey impact limitation. The court chose to reaffirm this limitation and allowed mental distress damages without
impact to the plaintiff. Although Kirksey, and its reaffirmation by
La Porte, constitutes a partial abrogation of the "impact rule," many
other jurisdictions have eliminated the impact requirement even in
cases involving simple negligence. 8 Florida has not yet done so and
is thus behind the current trend in the area.
The second and most important aspect of the La Porte decision is
its allowance of mental distress damages for trespass to chattels. No
jurisdiction has been found that allows such a recovery when the
acts involved constitute only simple negligence; 9 the issue regarding
a mental distress recovery for intentional or malicious trespass to mere
chattels has been decided by few courts10 and appears unsettled. The
majority of these decisions is in accord with La Porte in allowing such
damages if the acts directed at the plaintiff's chattel are intentional or
malicious. Even though La Porte is the first case in which the Florida
court has been presented with this question in the clear context of a
trespass to mere chattels," the court's discussion of the matter appears
inadequate. The court merely stated that the affection of a master
for his dog is such a "real thing"' 2 that recovery should be allowed.
The distinction between acts directed at a plaintiff and those directed
at his chattels was not examined. Nevertheless, it would seem that
La Porte can be used as direct authority for a recovery of damages
for mental distress if the defandant's acts constitute an intentional or
malicious trespass to plaintiff's chattel. Although the property status
of the dog involved in La Porte was not defined, such animals are

8.

Brown v. Crocker, 139 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 1962); Brown v. Broome

County, 10 App. Div. 2d 152, 197 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1960); Lanford v. West Oakland
Cemetery Addition, Inc., 223 S.C. 350, 75 S.E.2d 865 (1953).

9. See Cremillion v. C. & L. Const. Co., 125 So. 2d 198 (Ala. 1960) and Davis
v. Hall, 21 Ga. App. 265, 94 S.E. 274 (1917) where the issue is discussed.
10.

Louisville & N.R.R. v. Fletcher, 194 Ala. 257, 69 So. 634 (1915); Wilson v.

Kuykendall, 112 Miss. 486, 73 So. 344 (1916). Contra, White Sewing Mach. Co. v.
Lindsay, 14 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
11. See Kirksey v. Jernigan, supra note 2, in which it is unclear whether the
court allowed a recovery for mental distress as a separate tort or as incident to
trespass to a chattel, or based such recovery upon the dead body exception to
the impact rule. This latter exception is recognized in the Restatement of Torts
§868 (1939).
12. La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964).
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chattels,'13 and the decision dearly appears to support the above
proposition. In light of the fact that only a very few other jurisdictions have allowed such recoveries, 1 the Florida court has apparently
placed itself on the advancing front in this area of tort law. As
Florida has not yet eliminated the impact requirement in simple
negligence cases and is thus behind the current trend,. La Porte appears as a bold step by our court.
A third and certainly noteworthy facet of La Porte is that it may
indicate a movement by the Florida court toward recognizing intentional infliction of mental distress as a separate and distinct tort.
Although not dearly settled, the present Florida position seems to
be that mental distress is an element of damages and not a separate
tort. 5 If this case is used as authority for a recovery of damages for
mental distress for acts directed at third persons rather than chattels,
the effect will be to recognize mental distress as a separate tort in
this state. When the acts of the defendant are directed at a third
person rather than at the plaintiff or his property interest, there is
no technical tort committed against the plaintiff other than the infliction of mental distress. Thus to allow a recovery in such a case
is in effect permitting a recovery for mental distress as a separate
tort rather than as an element of damages. Florida has not yet considered the question whether a plaintiff can recover for mental distress
for acts directed at a third person, but a few jurisdictions have allowed
such a recovery when the act of the defendant were malicious or
intentional.' 6 Even though La Porte involved chattels, a strong
argument can be made that if mental distress damages are recoverable for acts directed at a dog, certainly they should be recoverable for
acts directed at a person with whom the injured party enjoys a close
relationship. This argument appears reasonable and is supported by
the rationale of La Porte.
Recognition of mental distress as a separate tort would allow a
recovery in many cases in which it has been previously denied.'7
These cases cover situations in which the defendant's acts result in
mental anguish as the only injury or technical "tort" to the plaintiff
and include acts directed at the plaintiff, his chattels, or a third
person.
13.

Hamby v. Sampson, 105 Iowa 112, 74 N.W. 918 (1898).

14. See note 10 supra.
15. See note 11 supra.
16. Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47
Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916).
17. See, e.g., Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1958); Dunahoo
v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941). See also foreign jurisdictions, Holland v.
Good Bros. Inc., 318 Mass. 800, 61 N.E.2d 544 (1945); Thompson v. Minnis, 202
P.2d 981 (Okla. 1949).
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